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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Reasoned opinions count as much or more than outcomes, 
partly because “reasoned response to reasoned argument is an 
essential aspect of [the judicial] process,”1 and partly because “the 
opinion has as one if not its major office to show how like cases are 
properly to be decided in the future.”2  Scrutiny of the Supreme 
Court’s reasons is called for not only when the result seems 
doubtful, but also when the result is intuitively appealing.  Weak 
reasons may in the long run undermine a holding that deserves a 
better foundation than the Court has built for it, or at least distort 
and delay the elaboration of doctrine.  When the intuition behind 
the holding deserves broader application than the Court’s reasons 
can support, an effort to identify more convincing reasons is an 
especially worthwhile project.   
Heffernan v. City of Paterson,3 illustrates the good result/weak 
reasons problem.  Under settled First Amendment principles, a 
public employee may not be fired or demoted for speech on a 
matter of public concern, unless the speech threatens to disrupt 
the workplace and the disruption outweighs the value of the 
speech.4  In Heffernan the Supreme Court dealt with an odd 
variation on regulation of public employee speech.  Jeffrey 
Heffernan, a police officer, was demoted by the City of Paterson 
because his supervisors mistakenly believed he had engaged in 
protected speech.5  On the facts stipulated by the Court, 
Heffernan’s mother had asked him to pick up a yard sign that 
showed support for Spagnola, a mayoral candidate.6  Spagnola’s 
opponent, the incumbent, had appointed the current police chief, 
James Wittig.7  Other officers spotted Heffernan at the Spagnola 
                                                                                                                   
 1 David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987). 
 2 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 26 (1960). 
 3 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016). 
 4 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (holding that a government employee’s 
distribution of an inter-office questionnaire about her employer warranted termination 
because it disrupted the workplace); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (“[A] 
teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the 
basis for his dismissal from public employment.”). 
 5 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.  
 6 Id.  
 7 Id.  
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yard-sign distribution site and told his supervisors, who wrongly 
inferred that Heffernan was involved in Spagnola’s campaign.8  As 
punishment for his supposed advocacy against the current mayor, 
Wittig demoted Heffernan from detective to patrol officer.9  Citing 
the First Amendment’s protection of public employee speech, 
Heffernan sued the city for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.10  He 
lost in the lower courts.11  They reasoned that, by his own 
admission, Heffernan had not engaged in protected speech by 
picking up the sign.12  Although Wittig acted with a 
constitutionally impermissible motive, his mistake of fact saved 
him from liability.13   
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of 
“[w]hether the First Amendment bars the government from 
demoting a public employee based on a supervisor’s perception 
that the employee supports a political candidate.”14  The dilemma 
presented by the case is that the act of picking up a yard sign, if 
done merely as a favor for someone, is not protected speech.15  
However unfair it may seem, so far as the Constitution is 
concerned, Wittig could have fired Heffernan for that act.16  At the 
                                                                                                                   
 8 Id.  
 9 Id.  
 10 Id.  Justice Thomas dissented, in an opinion joined by Justice Alito.  Id. at 1420.  
Section 1983 is widely used to bring challenges to state government practices for violating 
federal constitutional and statutory norms.  It authorizes a cause of action against “[e]very 
person who, under color of [state law] subjects, or cause to be subjected, 
any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured . . . .”  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).  A local government is a 
“person” subject to suit under § 1983.  Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).  
As a result a local government could be held liable for the “single decision[s] of municipal 
policymakers.”  Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986).  This could include 
the decision of the police chief to demote Jeffrey Heffernan.  For more information 
regarding § 1983 actions brought against local governments, see generally SHELDON H. 
NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 294–313 (4th ed. 2015). 
 11 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 563, 584 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, Heffernan v. 
City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147, 154 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 12 Id.  
 13 Id.  
 14 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (No. 14-1280). 
 15 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.  
 16 Id. Some public employees are entitled to a due process hearing before or shortly after 
dismissal.  On account of the contracts under which they hold their posts, they have a 
“property” interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 
928–29 (1997) (stating that “public employees who can be discharged only for cause have a 
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same time, Heffernan was actually fired not because he did a favor 
for his mother, but because his supervisors mistakenly thought he 
had engaged in protected speech.17  That is a constitutionally 
impermissible motive.  On the one hand, the case did not involve a 
straightforward violation of First Amendment rights.  On the 
other hand, Chief Wittig ignored basic First Amendment norms. 
The Court ruled in Heffernan’s favor, over a dissent authored 
by Justice Thomas joined by Justice Alito.18  Yet Justice Breyer’s 
majority opinion is quite puzzling.  It contains elements of at least 
two rationales, but does not adequately support either of them.  
First, the Court might have held, as the petition for certiorari 
suggested,19 that the city violated Heffernan’s First Amendment 
rights.  Yet the opinion contains no statement to that effect, the 
dissent denies that the Court so held, and Justice Breyer does not 
refute that assertion.20  Second, it might have held that the City of 
Paterson acted under an unconstitutional policy, since Wittig 
acted for a constitutionally impermissible motive.  This theory of 
the case applies the general rule that local governments can be 
held liable under § 1983 for the actions of government policy 
                                                                                                                   
constitutionally protected property interest in their tenure and cannot be fired without due 
process”).  The requirement of “cause” amounts to showing that there is good reason for the 
employment decision.  See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538–39 
(1985) (a contract that guaranteed employment during “good behavior and efficient service” 
created a property right).  The requirement of cause would probably not be satisfied on 
these facts.  See Michael L. Wells & Alice E. Snedeker, State-Created Property and Due 
Process of Law: Filling the Void Left by Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 44 GA. L. 
REV. 161, 166 (2009) (listing “incompetence, insubordination, criminal misconduct . . . [as] 
grounds that would justify dismissal”).  But it appears that Heffernan had no such due 
process protection.  State law may also provide some protection for the employee.  See Brief 
of New Jersey State League of Municipalities as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
at 5, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (No. 14-1280) (stating “New Jersey has afforded protections to 
public employees and shielded them from adverse employment decisions rooted in political 
influences . . .”).  
 17 Hefffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.  
 18 Id. at 1419.  The Court remanded the case for consideration of another ground on 
which the city may prevail.  Id.  It noted  “some evidence in the record . . . suggesting that 
Heffernan’s employers may have dismissed him pursuant to a different and neutral policy 
prohibiting police officers from overt involvement in any political campaign,” and directed 
the lower courts to look into “[w]hether that policy existed, whether Heffernan’s supervisors 
were indeed following it, and whether it complies with constitutional standards.”  Id. 
 19 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (No. 14-1280).  
 20 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1420 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
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makers, a category that probably includes Chief Wittig.21  This 
ground was not briefed, did not figure in the lower courts’ 
resolution of the case, and would entail the overruling of a 
Supreme Court precedent.22  The Court devotes no more than 
three opaque sentences to it.23  Nonetheless the dissent asserts 
that it is the majority’s rationale, and Justice Breyer does not 
dispute that claim.24 
In this Article, I examine both of these grounds and show that 
neither of them is viable, unless the Court is to be understood as 
having revised First Amendment or § 1983 doctrine without any 
explicit articulation of the changes.  I propose two alternate 
rationales that avoid the objections to those theories and may 
provide a stable foundation for the outcome.  One is to shift the 
source of the liability rule away from the First Amendment.  
Instead, it could be located in federal common law, and more 
particularly constitutional common law.25  Viewed in this way, 
Heffernan may be understood and defended as a judge-made 
principle aimed at enforcement of the constitutional values behind 
the public employee speech doctrine.  Another strategy is to put 
aside the First Amendment aspect of the case in favor of a focus on 
Wittig’s arbitrary treatment of Heffernan.  Under the Equal 
Protection Clause, a “class of one” can recover for an injury by 
showing that an official made an irrational distinction, singling 
him out for bad treatment.26  The problem with this theory is that 
                                                                                                                   
 21 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) (overruling precedent that 
gave immunity to local governments from suit under § 1983).  
 22 See generally Brief for Petitioner, Heffernan, 123 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (No. 14-1280); 
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 563 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, Heffernan v. City of 
Paterson, 777 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2015).  
 23 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1417.  
 24 Id. at 1421–22 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 25 The leading and still authoritative article on this topic is Henry P. Monaghan, The 
Supreme Court 1974 Term, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 
(1975). 
 26 See Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (explaining “an equal 
protection claim can in some circumstances be sustained even if the plaintiff has not alleged 
class-based discrimination, but instead claims that she has been irrationally singled out as 
a so-called “class of one”).  
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the current doctrine may exclude public employees like Jeffrey 
Heffernan from its coverage.27  
Part II distinguishes between the “violation of First 
Amendment rights” and “§ 1983 local government liability” 
themes.  Parts III and IV discuss each of the two in turn and 
explain why neither is adequately supported by the opinion.  Part 
V suggests that Jeffrey Heffernan’s victory can be justified more 
convincingly as an exercise in constitutional common law making 
or “class of one” Equal Protection.  
II.  TWO STRANDS OF REASONING 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion contains elements of two 
distinct, though related, rationales for ruling in the plaintiff’s 
favor.  One of these would be a simple constitutional holding: 
Paterson, acting through Wittig, violated Heffernan’s First 
Amendment rights by demoting him, and therefore is liable for the 
resulting injury.  The second would be a bit more complex, because 
it brings in a special § 1983 doctrine as well as the First 
Amendment: Paterson would be liable under § 1983 for Wittig’s 
actions, because Wittig acted for a constitutionally impermissible 
motive.  We can call the first a “constitutional” ground and the 
other a “statutory” ground.  It is useful to keep the two separate, 
even though they are related in an important sense.  At least 
under the § 1983 doctrine as it stood before Heffernan, the plaintiff 
has been required to prove a violation of his constitutional rights 
in order to win on the second theory as well as the first.  The Court 
so held in Los Angeles v. Heller.28  But the two are conceptually 
distinct, in that the § 1983 rationale does not ineluctably entail 
showing a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, only 
unconstitutional motivation.  Thus, one way to read the opinion is 
that the Court implicitly overruled Heller and opened the door to 
broader municipal liability across the board. 
                                                                                                                   
 27 See id. at 594 (holding that the “class of one” theory “has no place in the public 
employment context”). 
 28 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam).  The possibility that Heffernan has implicitly 
overruled Heller is discussed in Part III below. 
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A.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 
The Court might have, but did not, answer the First 
Amendment question presented in Jeffrey Heffernan’s petition for 
certiorari with a simple “yes.”  Instead of responding to the 
question in such a straightforward fashion, Justice Breyer invites 
the reader to connect the dots.  Near the beginning of the opinion, 
Justice Breyer frames the issue by stating, “The question is 
whether the official’s factual mistake makes a critical legal 
difference.  Even though the employee had not in fact engaged in 
protected political activity, did his demotion deprive him of a 
right . . . secured by the Constitution?  42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We hold 
that it did.”29 
This passage may be understood as an oblique “yes” in response 
to the question presented by the petition for certiorari.  Yet the 
dissent claims that the Court found no violation of Heffernan’s 
constitutional rights.30  The majority opinion does not ever directly 
state that Paterson violated Heffernan’s constitutional rights.  Nor 
does it take issue with the dissent’s assertion to the contrary.  Nor 
does the majority take advantage of the ample resources provided 
by Heffernan’s brief and the amicus brief filed on his behalf by the 
Solicitor General to construct a theory of First Amendment public 
employee speech that would support such a right.  On the other 
hand, the possibility that the Court indeed intended to make a 
rule of constitutional law cannot be dismissed out of hand. 
B.  THE STATUTORY GROUND 
The Court’s reference to § 1983, along with a passage that 
refers to Paterson’s “policy,” suggests a different rationale.31  This 
one depends on the presence of the City of Paterson as a 
defendant.  Monell v. Department of Social Services held that 
                                                                                                                   
 29 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416. 
 30 Id. at 1420 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“As in most § 1983 suits, [Heffernan’s] claim could 
be that the City interfered with his freedom to speak and assemble.  But because Heffernan 
has conceded that he was not engaged in protected speech or assembly when he picked up 
the sign, the majority must resort to a second, more novel framing.  It concludes that 
Heffernan states a § 1983 claim because the City unconstitutionally regulated employees’ 
political speech and Heffernan was injured because that policy resulted in his demotion.”).  
 31 Id. at 1417 (majority opinion).  
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municipalities can be held liable under § 1983 for the acts of their 
officials.32  But Monell also held that they are not vicariously liable 
for all official acts.33  The plaintiff must show that the injury was 
caused by an “official policy.”34  As applied to Heffernan, the theory 
is that Wittig’s unconstitutional motive is a municipal policy, and 
that the faulty policy caused the demotion.  Support for this theory 
of the case may be found in Justice Breyer’s statement that “[t]he 
Government acted upon a constitutionally harmful policy whether 
Heffernan did or did not in fact engage in political activity.”35  
Moreover, “Heffernan was directly harmed, namely, demoted, 
through application of that policy.”36  In this line of reasoning, the 
municipal “policy” and the constitutional violation are one and the 
same.  The crucial element is Wittig’s unconstitutional motivation, 
coupled with resulting harm in the form of a demotion. 
These two potential rationales may seem on a quick reading to 
be alternate ways of saying the same thing.  But they are not.  The 
difference between them is this: The first would hold that the city 
violated Heffernan’s First Amendment rights, while the second 
would not necessarily do so.  Rather, the second rationale would 
establish liability under § 1983 by proof that a constitutionally 
harmful policy has caused harm, such as Heffernan’s demotion.  In 
principle, if not in pre-Heffernan practice under Los Angeles v. 
Heller, no violation of Heffernan’s constitutional rights would be 
required for governmental liability.37  But the distinction between 
the two grounds collapses unless we stipulate that the Court has 
implicitly overruled or distinguished Heller. 
III.  HEFFERNAN AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The opinion contains no declarative sentence to the effect that 
Paterson violated Heffernan’s First Amendment rights, nor even a 
rebuttal to the dissent’s charge that the Court did not so hold.  
That absence is not due to a failure of advocacy.  In support of such 
                                                                                                                   
 32 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). 
 33 Id.  
 34 Id.  
 35 136 S. Ct. at 1418. 
 36 Id. at 1419. 
 37 See generally 475 U.S. 796 (1986).  
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a right, Jeffrey Heffernan’s lawyers asserted that “[r]espondents 
violated the First Amendment by demoting Heffernan because 
they perceived that he supported the mayor’s opponent in the 
upcoming election.”38  Similarly, the United States filed an amicus 
brief in support of Heffernan, in which it maintained that “[a] 
public employer violates the First Amendment when, absent 
justification, it acts against an employee with the purpose of 
suppressing disfavored political beliefs, even if the employer’s 
perception of those beliefs is mistaken.”39  Both briefs put forward 
reasoned arguments in support of that position.  Yet the Court’s 
opinion omits any statement that the claimed First Amendment 
right exists.  
A.  THE COURT’S “CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS” REASONING 
The Court’s rhetorical strategy is to invoke the First 
Amendment, but without any explicit statement that Heffernan’s 
constitutional rights were violated.  For example, Justice Breyer 
frames the holding by stating, “When an employer demotes an 
employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in 
political activity that the First Amendment protects, the employee 
is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First 
Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .”40  
This passage seems to invite the reader to construct a 
syllogism: (1) § 1983 is available for constitutional violations; (2) 
§ 1983 is available to Heffernan; (3) therefore, the City violated 
Heffernan’s constitutional right.  
One problem with the syllogism is that the availability of § 1983 
does not necessarily mean that the right of which the plaintiff has 
been deprived is a constitutional right.  That statute authorizes 
suits to recover for violations of federal “laws” as well as the 
                                                                                                                   
 38 Brief for Petitioner at 12, Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (No. 14-
1280). 
 39 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 7, Heffernan v. 
City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016) (No. 14-1280). 
 40 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418. 
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Constitution,41 and “laws” arguably includes federal common law 
as well as statutory rights.42  In addition, the proposition that 
Heffernan may successfully “challenge . . . unlawful action under 
the First Amendment” is not precisely equivalent to the 
proposition that Paterson violated Heffernan’s First Amendment 
right.43  The Court’s careful language leaves open the possibility 
that the specific source of the right being recognized is not the 
First Amendment, even though that right promotes First 
Amendment values.   
Besides the quoted language, the opinion treats the case as one 
that raises a public employee speech issue under the First 
Amendment and cites the principal cases in the development of 
that doctrine, including Pickering v. Board of Education,44 Connick 
v. Myers,45 and Garcetti v. Ceballos.46  This “Pickering/Connick” 
doctrine, as it is often called, protects employees from adverse 
employment actions taken against them for speech on matters of 
public concern, unless the potential disruptive impact outweighs 
the “public concern” value of the speech.47  Garcetti holds that the 
doctrine does not protect speech that is part of the employee’s 
job.48  After describing these cases, the Court sets them aside.  The 
cases “did not present the kind of question at issue here,” because 
                                                                                                                   
 41 See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 252 (2009) (noting that 
while some statutes preclude § 1983 claims, the Court looks to Congressional intent and the 
remedial schemes of a statute to determine if a § 1983 claim is available). 
 42 See Michael L. Wells, Constitutional Common Law, Section 193, and Heffernan v. City 
of Paterson (Aug. 11, 2016) (unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (arguing that 
Heffernan’s holding allows courts to make common law rules in order to implement the 
First Amendment). 
 43 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418.  
 44 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (finding a teacher’s letter to a local newspaper regarding a 
proposed tax increase was speech from a member of the community about a topic of public 
concern). 
 45 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (finding the discharge of a former assistant district attorney did 
not violate the right to free speech). 
 46 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (finding a district attorney’s speech was not protected under the 
First Amendment because he was not speaking as a citizen when he wrote a memo). 
 47 See NAHMOD ET AL., supra note 10, at 205–14 (discussing situations in which a public 
employee is fired or penalized on account of the employee’s speech). 
 48 547 U.S. at 421 (stating “when public employees make statements pursuant to their 
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment 
purposes. . .”).  
2016] HEFFERNAN  11 
 
“no factual mistake was at issue.”49  The Court turns instead to 
Waters v. Churchill,50 which is “more to the point,” since the 
Churchill Court “did consider the consequences of an employer 
mistake.”51  
In Waters, a nurse at a public hospital was fired after she spoke 
with coworkers.52  The supervisors who dismissed her had 
investigated the incident but evidently made a mistake of fact, 
because they believed that she had discussed only internal issues 
that would not trigger Pickering/Connick protection.53  In fact, she 
had discussed matters of public concern that met the 
Pickering/Connick test.54  Although there was no majority opinion, 
the Court upheld the hospital’s decision, and the case is generally 
cited for the proposition that a public employee who engages in 
protected speech may nonetheless be fired if the dismissal is based 
on a supervisor’s reasonable belief that the speech was not 
protected.55  Justice Breyer describes it as a case in which  
The Court held that, as long as the employer (1) had 
reasonably believed that the employee’s conversation 
had involved personal matters, not matters of public 
concern, and (2) had dismissed the employee because 
of that mistaken belief, the dismissal did not violate 
the First Amendment.  In a word, it was the 
employer’s motive, and in particular the facts as the 
employer reasonably understood them, that mattered. 
 In Waters; the employer reasonably but mistakenly 
thought that the employee had not engaged in 
protected speech.  Here the employer mistakenly 
thought that the employee had engaged in protected 
speech.  If the employer’s motive (and in particular the 
                                                                                                                   
 49 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1417 (2016). 
 50 511 U.S. 661 (1994). 
 51 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418. 
 52 511 U.S. at 664–65.  
 53 Id. at 664–66.  
 54 Id. at 680.  
 55 Edward J. Valaquez, Waters v. Churchill: Government-Employer Efficiency, Judicial 
Deference, and the Abandonment of Public-Employee Free Speech by the Supreme Court, 61 
BROOK. L. REV. 1055, 1057–58 (1995) (discussing the implications of Waters v. Churchill).  
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facts as the employer reasonably understood them) is 
what mattered in Waters, why is the same not true 
here?  After all, in the law, what is sauce for the goose 
is normally sauce for the gander. 
 We conclude that, as in Waters, the government’s 
reason for demoting Heffernan is what counts here.56  
This analogy to Waters, and its rejection of Pickering, Connick, and 
Garcetti, is the full extent of the Court’s treatment of public 
employee speech doctrine. 
B.  REASONS TO REJECT THE “CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS” READING OF 
HEFFERNAN 
The core principle of the First Amendment public employee 
speech doctrine is that the employee should be protected because 
he has engaged in speech on a matter of public concern, which 
Jeffrey Heffernan did not do.57  Unless the doctrine is reworked to 
focus on the employer’s perceptions, as Heffernan and the United 
States proposed, it does not support the claimed right.  Rather 
than adopting a version of the theory offered by Heffernan and the 
United States, the Court meets this objection by citing Waters, 
another case in which the supervisor acted under a mistake of 
fact.58  But the Court’s analogy to Waters does not succeed in 
linking the two cases, because the two mistakes are not relevantly 
similar. 
Moreover, to treat the right recognized in Heffernan as a 
constitutional right would have implications beyond the narrow 
facts of that case.  It would add a level of complexity to the First 
Amendment doctrine, by introducing into the matrix of First 
Amendment principles a new theme—unconstitutional motivation, 
even if the government’s act does not touch protected speech—with 
unforeseeable and perhaps ungovernable consequences.  This 
                                                                                                                   
 56 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418 (citation omitted). 
 57 See Picking v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573–74 (1968) (indicating that a public 
official’s statements on matters of public concern are protected under the First Amendment 
because of the public interest in “free and unhindered debate on matters of public 
importance”).  
 58 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418.  
2016] HEFFERNAN  13 
 
hypothesized new doctrine was never clearly articulated in the 
Court’s opinion and escaped detection by the dissent.  The 
following are reasons to question not only the viability of the 
purported rule, but also its existence. 
1.  Public Employee Speech Doctrine.  Public employees do not 
have an unconditional right to speak as they please and remain 
employed by the government.59  This does not mean that they risk 
their jobs whenever they speak.  In Pickering v. Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court held that when the employee has 
spoken on a matter of public concern, he has some First 
Amendment protection against dismissal or demotion.60  Pickering 
is a speech-protective case, but its rationale limits its scope.  In 
Connick v. Myers,61 the Court reiterated and refined the Pickering 
framework.  It ruled that “[w]hen employee expression cannot be 
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy 
wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive 
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.”62  
Under Pickering/Connick, the rationale for First Amendment 
protection of public employee speech is that the employee has 
spoken on a matter of public concern.63  Even if the employee has 
spoken on a matter of public concern, the government may have 
adequate grounds for disciplining him.64  Pickering/Connick 
requires that the value of the protected speech be balanced against 
its actual and potential costs in disrupting the work of the office.65  
                                                                                                                   
 59 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (discussing both the interests of 
the government in limiting the speech of public employees as well as the public employee’s 
own right to speech).  
 60 Id. at 570. 
 61 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
 62 Id. at 146; see also Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014) (discussing the “special 
value” of public employee speech related to the employment); Heidi Kitrosser, The Special 
Value of Public Employee Speech, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 1 301, 336 (“Judicial review in the 
work product context can and should be designed not to second-guess supervisor 
assessments of work product quality, but to smoke out retaliation against work product 
speech for reasons other than quality.”). 
 63 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72.  
 64 Connick, 461 U.S. at 150–51.  
 65 Id.  
14 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 51:1 
 
If the latter outweighs the former, the employee can be 
disciplined.66  
Justice Breyer sets these cases aside, since they do not involve 
mistake of fact and thus “did not present the kind of question at 
issue here.”67  But that is not so.  On the contrary, they are directly 
relevant to the question presented in Heffernan, because in these 
cases the basis for the employee’s First Amendment right is that 
the employee has spoken on a matter of public concern.68  Absent 
public concern speech, the public employee speech doctrine, as it 
has been understood since Pickering, does not apply to the 
interaction between the employer and the employee.69  The crucial 
fact, which Justice Breyer never directly addresses, is that 
Heffernan was not speaking on a matter of public concern.   
A cogent argument can be made in support of a different 
approach to public employee speech.  It involves shifting attention 
away from what the employee did or did not do, and turns instead 
to the purpose behind the doctrine.70  The purpose of First 
Amendment protection of public employee speech on matters of 
public concern is to encourage that speech.71  When the supervisor 
acts with a bad motive, he often suppresses protected speech.  His 
motive depends on his perception of the facts.  Reasoning along 
these lines, Heffernan’s lawyers, as well as the United States as 
amici curiae, advanced the view that “[a] First Amendment 
retaliation claim is predicated on the employer’s perception of the 
employee’s speech or association, and the employer’s decision to 
fire or demote the employee because of that perception.”72  Circuit 
                                                                                                                   
 66 Id. 
 67 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1417.  
 68 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571–72.  
 69 Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.  
 70 See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 198 
(1988) (arguing that “the most significant aspects of first amendment law can be seen as 
judge-made prophylactic rules that exceed the requirements of the ‘real’ first amendment”). 
 71 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 (2005) (“[T]he First Amendment protects a 
public employee’s political affiliation which caused the dismissal.”).  
 72 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 38, at 14; see also Brief for the United States, supra 
note 39, at 11 (“When the government acts with the purpose of suppressing disfavored 
political association . . . it violates the First Amendment.”).  
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court precedent was available to support such a holding.73  
Whatever the merit of that approach, the key point is that that the 
Court did not adopt the “perception” theory of First Amendment 
rights, at least not explicitly.  It turned instead to the supervisors’ 
mistake of fact and drew an analogy to the mistake made in 
Waters.74   
2. The Waters Analogy.  In order to rely on Waters, the Court 
compares the mistake made in that case to the mistake made in 
Heffernan.75  Justice Breyer then asserts that mistake should 
function in the same way in the two contexts, since, as he puts it, 
“what is sauce for the goose is normally sauce for the gander.”76  
But analogies are treacherous, because their force depends on 
relevant similarity between the items that are analogized.77  It is 
all too easy to focus on a similarity that is not relevant.  That is 
the problem here.  Since supervisors made mistakes in both, the 
two cases are superficially similar.78  But the mistakes relate to 
entirely different issues and do not provide the relevant similarity 
needed for a powerful argument from analogy. 
In Waters, the Court did not have to decide whether or not the 
plaintiff’s speech was a matter of public concern.79  The 
supervisor’s mistake was relevant to an issue that comes after that 
one: the Connick constraint on liability.  A majority of the Justices 
endorsed the view that the employer’s interests in an efficient 
workplace sufficed to justify the firing, even if it was based on a 
mistake as to what the employee said.80  The holding in Waters is 
that, despite the public concern content of the speech, the 
employer’s mistake may be excused, so long as the employer 
                                                                                                                   
 73 See Dye v. Office of the Racing Comm’n, 702 F.3d 286, 299–300 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(agreeing with the First and Tenth Circuits’ holdings that a retaliation claim can be based 
on an employee’s political affiliation which caused the dismissal). 
 74 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016).  
 75 Id.  
 76 Id.  
 77 See Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 
745 (1993) (stating arguments from analogy succeed only if “A and B are ‘relevantly’ 
similar, and . . . there are not ‘relevant’ differences between them”). 
 78 Compare Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416, with Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 663 
(1994).  
 79 511 U.S. at 680.  
 80 Id.  
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undertook a reasonable investigation.81  By contrast, the 
supervisor’s mistake in Heffernan relates to an entirely different 
issue, one that is anterior to the Waters employer-interest issue.  It 
was a mistake as to whether Jeffrey Heffernan engaged in 
protected speech in the first place.82  If he did not, the speech-
protective Pickering/Connick doctrine is not triggered.83  There is 
no relation between the two issues on which the employers made 
mistakes, and no basis for an argument by analogy from the 
holding with regard to the Waters mistake to the proper treatment 
of the Heffernan mistake.  To put this point in a different way, 
suppose the Court had adopted the “perception” theory of First 
Amendment rights proposed by Heffernan’s lawyer.84  The viability 
of that theory neither needs nor benefits from Waters, because 
Waters does not address the content of First Amendment rights.  It 
addresses the content of a good excuse for firing someone who has 
already exercised First Amendment rights.85 
3.  Consequences of a Constitutional Holding. Unless it is 
cabined, the “constitutional rights” reading of Heffernan could 
morph into a principle, or at least an argument, that 
misperception of the facts coupled with unconstitutional 
motivation can give rise to a First Amendment violation.  That 
principle, in turn, may have impact beyond the public employee 
speech context.  Suppose the police take steps to close down a 
movie theater, mistakenly believing that the movies are 
constitutionally protected, when in fact they are not.  Suppose 
officials regulate advertising that they mistakenly believe is 
constitutionally protected.  Suppose they mistakenly believe that a 
planned demonstration on public property is protected, though it is 
not.  They attempt to suppress it, but fail only because bad 
weather keeps the protesters at home.  Have they committed 
violations of First Amendment rights?  While all of these 
hypotheticals could be distinguished from Heffernan, if only on the 
                                                                                                                   
 81 Id. at 679–80.  
 82 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1416 (2016).  
 83 See id. at 1423 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “to state a First Amendment 
retaliation claim, the public employee must allege that she spoke on a matter of public 
concern”). 
 84 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 38, at 12–14.  
 85 Waters v. Churchill, Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 667 (1994).  
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ground that none of them are public employee speech cases, the 
“constitutionally impermissible motive” principle would add a new 
and potentially troublesome dimension to adjudication of First 
Amendment issues.  But my point is not that the principle is 
unsound.  I maintain only that it is implausible to read Heffernan 
as having introduced such a potentially broad doctrine into First 
Amendment law without laying a foundation for it, articulating it 
clearly, exploring its implications and limits, or even responding to 
the dissent’s assertion that the Court has done no such thing. 
One might avoid these consequences by framing the putative 
constitutional right in a somewhat different way.  The employee’s 
right to speak on a matter of public concern has a corollary: a right 
not to speak.  Jeffrey Heffernan chose not to speak and was 
demoted.86  Therefore, the argument goes, the demotion deprived 
him of a constitutional right.  As Justice Thomas points out in 
dissent, the problem with this line of reasoning is that the plaintiff 
in a retaliation claim is obliged to show a causal connection 
between the right and the adverse action.87  In the public employee 
speech context, causation is determined by identifying the reason 
for the adverse employment action.88  Heffernan was not fired 
because he exercised his constitutional right not to speak.  He was 
fired because his supervisor mistakenly believed he had exercised 
his constitutional right to speak.89 
IV.  THE “MUNICIPAL POLICY” GROUND  
The First Amendment issue was the sole focus of the lower 
courts, the petition for certiorari, and the briefs filed by the parties 
and amici.90  But parts of Justice Breyer’s opinion suggest that the 
Court treats the case in a rather different way.  Under § 1983, a 
local government is liable for some, but not all, constitutional 
                                                                                                                   
 86 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.  
 87 Id. at 1421 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 88 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286 (1976). 
 89 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416.  
 90 See generally Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 563 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2015); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 14; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 38.  
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violations committed by its officers.91  While there is no respondeat 
superior liability, municipalities are liable for acts by officials that 
meet the Court’s test for “official policy.”92  The Court may have 
intended to base liability on this ground.  The dissent so asserts,93 
and Justice Breyer does not repudiate that assertion.  The 
distinctive feature of this theory is that, in principle, it could 
succeed without showing a violation of Heffernan’s First 
Amendment rights.  The problem for this theory is that pre-
Heffernan doctrine does require a violation of the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights.94  Thus, this reading differs from the first 
only if the Court has changed the municipality doctrine without 
saying so. 
A.  PATERSON’S UNLAWFUL POLICY 
The Court’s discussion of municipal policy is brief, oblique, and 
buried deep within the opinion.95  A reader unfamiliar with § 1983 
doctrine could easily overlook the significance of certain code 
words.  The relevant passage follows a brief discussion of the First 
Amendment’s command that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”96  Turning to the 
municipal liability issue, the Court said, in full: 
The Government acted upon a constitutionally harmful 
policy whether Heffernan did or did not in fact engage 
in political activity.  That which stands for a “law” of 
“Congress,” namely, the police department’s reason for 
                                                                                                                   
 91 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).  
 92 Id. at 690.  Municipal “custom” is another basis for liability, id. at 690–91, but the facts 
do not suggest grounds for finding a custom here and the Court does not rely at all on that 
ground. 
 93 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1420 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 94 See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 668 (1994) (discussing the plaintiff’s 
constitutional rights).  
 95 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418.  In addition, neither the Third Circuit, see 777 F.3d 147 
(3d Cir. 2015), nor the District Court, see 2 F. Supp. 3d 563 (D.N.J. 2014), nor any of the 
briefs address this local government liability issue.  The only issue presented in the Petition 
for Certiorari was “[w]hether the First Amendment bars the government from demoting a 
public employee based on a supervisor’s perception that the employee supports a political 
candidate.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at i.  
 96 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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taking action, “abridge[s] the freedom of speech” of 
employees aware of the policy.  And Heffernan was 
directly harmed, namely, demoted, through application 
of that policy.97  
This passage states a conclusion—that Heffernan was demoted 
due to a constitutionally harmful policy—but it leaves out the 
doctrinal background of local government  liability and the steps 
leading to a § 1983 municipal liability holding.  While one might 
have expected the opinion to include that framework,98 most of 
those steps can be discerned, at least in a tentative and 
approximate way, by applying settled § 1983 doctrine to the 
circumstances of the case.  Under that doctrine, municipal “policy” 
consists not only of rules of general application, but also includes 
the single act of a municipal policymaker.99  The demotion was the 
act of Heffernan’s “supervisors,” which included Wittig, the police 
chief.100  A plausible reading of the case is that the Court views 
Chief Wittig as the policymaker for police department employee 
discipline, and that the city’s policy is embodied in the act of 
demoting Heffernan.  Since the dismissal was based on a 
constitutionally impermissible motive of a final policymaker, it 
was based on a constitutionally impermissible policy.  
This line of reasoning spells out what the Court must have in 
mind in referring to Paterson’s “constitutionally harmful policy” 
and the injury to Heffernan “through application of that policy.”101  
Spelling it out, however, exposes an ambiguity in the Court’s 
rationale: Does the Court mean to hold that the City of Paterson, 
through the act of its police chief, violated Heffernan’s 
constitutional rights?  Or does it mean to hold that the 
                                                                                                                   
 97 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418–19. 
 98 See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1359 (2011) (“A municipality or other 
local government may be liable under this section if the governmental body itself ‘subjects’ a 
person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes’ a person ‘to be subjected’ to such a 
deprivation.”). 
 99 See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986).  In Pembaur, the Court 
rejected the view taken by Justice Powell in a dissenting opinion joined by Chief Justice 
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, that “policy” consists only of rules of general applicability.  
See id. at 499 (Powell, J., dissenting).  
 100 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1416. 
 101 Id. at 1418–19.  
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constitutionally suspect motivation of the police chief—the 
“constitutionally harmful policy”—caused an injury, the demotion, 
that is not itself a violation of a constitutional right?  Both of these 
possible answers are dubious under current doctrine.  Problems 
with the former are discussed in Part III.  The next section shows 
why the latter falls short, unless the Court means to make new 
law on local government liability, without an acknowledgement of 
the change. 
B.  OBSTACLES TO THE “§ 1983 MUNICIPAL LIABILITY” THEORY 
The City of Paterson might be liable under § 1983 on the 
ground that the demotion was caused by an unconstitutional 
official policy, or even, in the Court’s terminology, a 
“constitutionally harmful” official policy.102  Starting from the 
black letter rule that the single act of a municipality’s final 
policymaker is the city’s policy,103 the theory is that the police chief 
“acted upon a constitutionally harmful policy.”104  A resulting 
injury is also required.105  Despite the First Amendment rhetoric 
elsewhere in the opinion, the Court does not meet this prong by an 
assertion that Heffernan’s constitutional rights were violated. 
Rather, “Heffernan was directly harmed, namely, demoted, 
through application of that policy.”106  This statement of the 
holding provides yet another reason to doubt the “constitutional 
rights” version of the case. 
What is more, the municipal liability theory does not, under 
settled doctrine, sidestep the need to establish (a) a violation of the 
plaintiff’s constitutional rights, and (b) a causal link between the 
policy and the violation of his constitutional rights.  Here the 
problem is that (a) is missing, unless the discussion in Part II is 
mistaken.  Thus, the Court’s reluctance to make a forthright 
statement that Heffernan’s constitutional rights were violated is 
                                                                                                                   
 102 Id. at 1418.  
 103 See Miller v. Compton, 122 F.3d 1094, 1100 (8th Cir. 1997) (explaining that municipal 
liability may arise from a single act of a policymaker, but “the act must come from one in an 
authoritative policy making position and represent the official policy of the municipality”).  
 104 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1418.  
 105 Miller, 122 F.3d at 1099. 
 106 Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1419.  
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also a problem for the “official policy” rationale.  The doctrinal 
objection to the § 1983 rationale comes from City of Los Angeles v. 
Heller, a case in which the plaintiff was injured by police officers 
in the course of an arrest.107  In his § 1983 suit against the officers 
and the city, he raised two Fourth Amendment claims: that the 
arrest was without probable cause and that the officers used 
excessive force.108  As grounds for recovery against Los Angeles, he 
“contended that the city and the Police Department had adopted a 
policy of condoning excessive force in making arrests,” and 
introduced evidence at the trial in support of that assertion.109  
The District Court bifurcated the trial.110  In the first trial against 
one of the officers, the jury was instructed solely on the 
constitutional issues and returned a verdict for the officer.111  The 
Supreme Court held that the district judge correctly dismissed the 
case against Los Angeles: “If a person has suffered no 
constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, 
the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized 
the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the 
point.”112  
Justice Thomas’s Heffernan dissent identifies the problem with 
the Court’s effort to elide this objection.  He points out that an 
attempt to violate constitutional rights is not by itself a violation of 
those rights.113  Here the attempt to violate a right did result in 
some injury, the demotion.114  But proof that the plaintiff was 
harmed by the demotion does not amount to proof that his 
constitutional right was violated.  Since the demotion did not 
violate a constitutional right, it was not “the right kind of 
                                                                                                                   
 107 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (per curiam). 
 108 Id.  
 109 Id. at 801–02 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 110 Id. at 797. 
 111 Id. at 798.  
 112 Id. at 799.  The issue here is whether the case can proceed against Los Angeles, given 
the finding of no constitutional violation.  Whether the district court’s ruling on the 
constitutional issue is correct is a distinct issue, which can be raised on appeal. 
 113 See Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1422 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The mere fact that the 
government has acted unconstitutionally does not necessarily result in the violation of an 
individual’s constitutional rights, even when that individual has been injured.”). 
 114 Id.  
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injury,”115 but was instead a non-constitutional consequence of the 
failed attempt.  
Perhaps the Court meant to overrule or in some way 
distinguish Heller without discussion of the earlier case, much less 
an explanation of why it should be repudiated or distinguished.  
Indeed, this “municipal liability based on a policymaker’s bad 
motive” rationale is in some respects a more plausible account of 
the case than the “constitutional rights” thesis.  The dissent 
describes the majority opinion as a municipal liability ruling, and 
the majority does not dispute that description.116  Although Justice 
Thomas protests that Heffernan did not suffer the right kind of 
injury, he does not cite Heller.  That omission may be significant.  
As precedent, Heller is a candidate for reconsideration, if only 
because it was a summary disposition by a per curiam opinion 
without briefing or argument.117  The Heller holding drew a 
dissent from Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall.118  
On the other hand, the “municipal policy” reading of Heffernan 
is based on just three sentences in the opinion, none of which 
actually refer to the § 1983 local government liability doctrine they 
purportedly apply.  Neither the lower courts nor the parties nor 
the amici addressed either local government liability or Heller.119  
If the Court did overrule or distinguish Heller, it did so sub 
silentio, which is neither the usual practice nor a recommended 
one.120  A more likely explanation for the structure and content of 
the Heffernan opinion is that the majority set out to find in favor of 
Jeffrey Heffernan, but it wanted to make as little law as possible 
in reaching that result.  It did not intend to overrule or distinguish 
Heller, and it did not intend to recognize a novel First Amendment 
                                                                                                                   
 115 Id. 
 116 Compare id. (discussing municipal liability), with id. at 1416–19 (majority opinion) 
(failing to refute the dissent’s characterization).  
 117 Heller, 475 U.S. at 797.  
 118 Id. at 800–01 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall also dissented separately to 
object to the summary disposition.  Id. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 119 See generally Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 2 F. Supp. 3d 563 (D.N.J. 2014), aff’d, 
Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2015); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 
38; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 39.   
 120 See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 736–38 
(1987) (arguing judges should give reasons for their decisions so that they “can be debated, 
attacked, or undefended”). 
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principle either.  With this set of goals and constraints in mind, 
Justice Breyer cobbled together an opinion that consists largely of 
rhetorical sleight of hand, gaps in reasoning on the § 1983 issue, 
subtle evasions of the constitutional issue, and the Waters red 
herring.  
V.  TWO ALTERNATE PATHS TO THE RESULT 
The disconnect between the intuition that Jeffrey Heffernan 
ought to win and the weakness of the Court’s opinion may simply 
mean that the Justices were divided on the merits of the 
“perception” theory of the First Amendment advanced by 
Heffernan and the United States.  Another possibility is that the 
Court could not find a way to bridge the gap between the intuition 
that Jeffrey Heffernan should win and the absence of means at 
hand to achieve that goal without creating more problems later.  
For either of these reasons, the Court may have chosen to cope 
with its dilemma by issuing a vague and fragmentary opinion that, 
by design, would have little impact on future litigation.  
But the Court’s kernel of insight—that Jeffrey Heffernan was 
treated unfairly and ought to win—deserves further development 
for the benefit of others who find themselves in a similar 
predicament.  The disconnect should prompt efforts to construct a 
more convincing rationale.  One possibility is to sidestep the 
objections to the “First Amendment right” ground by shifting the 
source of the right from constitutional law to federal common law, 
more specifically, to “constitutional common law.”  Another is to 
focus on a different aspect of the case.  Even if free speech values 
were not at issue, Wittig’s demotion of Heffernan would be 
objectionable, simply because it was arbitrary and unjustified.  In 
principle, Heffernan may have a good Equal Protection claim, 
though certain features of current Equal Protection doctrine may 
foreclose it.  If Jeffrey Heffernan had chosen to pursue that route, 
his case would have presented an opportunity for modifying those 
limits on the Equal Protection theory.  
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A.  CONSTITUTIONAL COMMON LAW 
By “constitutional common law,” I mean the “substructure of 
substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their 
inspiration and authority from, but not required by, various 
constitutional provisions.”121  Viewed in this way, Heffernan may 
be understood and defended as a judge-made principle aimed at 
enforcement of the constitutional values behind the public 
employee speech doctrine.  But the holding that Heffernan is 
entitled to sue under § 1983 does not have the status of a 
constitutional holding, which would carry with it further 
implications for other areas of First Amendment doctrine.  Nor is 
such a federal common law right vulnerable to the “counter-
majoritarian difficulty,” which charges that judicial intervention 
by means of rulings on constitutional law is anti-democratic 
because the legislature and the executive cannot revise 
constitutional rulings.122  As a common law rule, Heffernan’s right 
to sue would be subject to both legislative and judicial 
modification. 
Constitutional common law is a variant of federal common law.  
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins held that “[t]here is no federal 
general common law.”123  But on the same day, in Hinderlider v. 
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., the Court held that 
“whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned 
between . . . two States is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon 
which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be 
conclusive.”124  In the decades since Hinderlider, the Court has 
made federal common law in an array of situations in which 
federal interests were at stake, including admiralty,125 foreign 
                                                                                                                   
 121 Monaghan, supra note 25, at 2–3. 
 122 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–17 (1962) (stating 
“when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an 
elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people”). 
 123 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
 124 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). 
 125 E.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 401 (1970) (holding that a 
wrongful death action under federal maritime law is maintainable for breach of maritime 
duties in order to “assure uniform vindication of federal policies”). 
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affairs,126 U.S. government contracts,127 and filling in gaps in 
federal statutes.128  In each of these contexts, some national 
interest justifies the creation of a federal common law rule.  
In constitutional common law, the national interest is the 
enforcement of constitutional values.  For example, the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule is aimed at deterring constitutional 
violations.129  But there is no constitutional right on the part of a 
criminal defendant to have illegally obtained evidence excluded 
from consideration.130  Whether to apply it in a given situation 
depends on a weighing of costs and benefits.131  In Stone v. Powell, 
for example, the issue was whether to allow a state prisoner to 
assert violation of Fourth Amendment rights in a federal habeas 
corpus proceeding.132  In his criminal trial in state court, the 
prisoner had asserted the illegality of a search that produced 
evidence leading to his conviction, and had thus sought to have the 
evidence excluded from the jury’s consideration.133  The state court 
denied the Fourth Amendment claim and he was convicted.134  He 
then brought a federal habeas corpus action to challenge the 
constitutional validity of his conviction, on the ground that the 
evidence was obtained by a search that violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights.135  The Court said that the aim of the 
exclusionary rule is “the deterrence of police conduct that violates 
Fourth Amendment rights,” that “the application of the rule has 
                                                                                                                   
 126 E.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 436–37 (1964) (holding that 
the act of state doctrine applies to a foreign expropriation because it serves “both the 
national interest and progress toward the goal of establishing the rule of law among 
nations”).  
 127 E.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988) (holding federal law can 
shield contractors from liability for design defects in military equipment because state laws 
can present “ ‘significant conflict’ with federal policy and must be displaced”). 
 128 E.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) 
(interpreting the Sherman Antitrust Act, stating Congress “expected the Courts to give 
shape to the statute’s broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition”). 
 129 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 222, 236 (2011) (discussing deterrence and 
the Fourth Amendment). 
 130 Monaghan, supra note 25, at 4 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)).  
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been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are 
thought most efficaciously served,” and that its application to any 
“particular context” depends on balancing its costs against its 
deterrent value.136  Turning to the habeas context, the Court 
stated that the cost of the application of the rule was great, 
because it “deflects the truthfinding process and often frees the 
guilty.”137  On the other side of the balance, the additional 
deterrent effect of applying the rule on habeas would be small, 
because the police already face the risk that evidence will be 
excluded at trial.138  Thus, “the additional contribution, if any, of 
the consideration of search-and-seizure claims of state prisoners 
on collateral review is small in relation to the costs.”139 
Another prominent example is the doctrine stemming from 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of 
Narcotics,140 in which the Court created a cause of action to 
recover damages for Fourth Amendment violations committed by 
federal officials.141  Yet today the limits on that cause of action 
make it clear that access to that cause of action rule is not a 
matter of constitutional right.  It may be denied if some other 
roughly similar remedy is available, or if “special factors 
counseling hesitation” weigh heavily against it.142  The most recent 
cases are Wilkie v. Robbins143 and Minneci v. Pollard.144  Wilkie 
denied a Bivens remedy to a landowner who complained about 
federal officials who, in an effort to induce him to grant the 
government an easement, interfered with his property rights by 
various acts of petty harassment.145  The special factors counseling 
hesitation included “the difficulty of defining limits to legitimate 
zeal on the public’s behalf in situations where hard bargaining is 
to be expected in the back-and-forth between public and private 
                                                                                                                   
 136 Id. at 486–88 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 137 Id. at 490. 
 138 Id. at 493. 
 139 Id. 
 140 403 U.S. 388 (1971).  
 141 See Monaghan, supra note 25, at 23–24. 
 142 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. 
 143 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
 144 132 S. Ct. 617 (2012). 
 145 555 U.S. at 537. 
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interests that the Government’s employees engage in every day.”146  
In Minneci a federal inmate held in a private prison was denied a 
Bivens remedy because, in the Court’s view, state tort law 
provided an adequate remedy for an inmate at a privately-
managed federal prison who complained about his medical 
treatment.147 
1.  A Constitutional Common Law Rationale for Heffernan.  
Both Bivens and the exclusionary rule are concerned with 
constitutional remedies.148  Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in 
Heffernan evokes a remedial theme as well, though in the context 
of recognizing a substantive right.  After the Waters analogy and 
the shadowy references of municipal policy, Justice Breyer turns to 
“the constitutional implications of a rule that imposes liability.”149  
Justice Breyer points out that  
The constitutional harm at issue in the ordinary case 
consists in large part of discouraging employees—both 
the employee discharged (or demoted) and his or her 
colleagues—from engaging in protected 
activities. . . . The upshot is that a discharge or 
demotion based upon an employer’s belief that the 
employee has engaged in protected activity can cause 
the same kind and degree, of constitutional harm 
whether that belief does or does not rest upon a factual 
mistake.150 
The imposition of liability will deter these impermissibly 
motivated employment actions and thus further First Amendment 
values, just as the exclusionary rule deters illegal searches and the 
Bivens doctrine deters federal officers from violating a range of 
constitutional rights. 
In support of its “constitutional harm” reasoning, the Court 
cites Gooding v. Wilson,151 a case decided under the First 
                                                                                                                   
 146 Id. at 554. 
 147 132 S. Ct. at 624–25. 
 148 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396 (discussing the exclusionary rule). 
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Amendment overbreadth doctrine.152  That doctrine deals with a 
danger presented by regulatory statutes that sweep too broadly, in 
a way that goes beyond the permissible scope of the government’s 
police power.153  Overbroad statutes are problematic because they 
cover not only matters the government is empowered to regulate 
but protected speech as well.154  In such a case, a litigant whose 
acts are regulated by the statute may challenge the provision on 
First Amendment grounds, even if his own conduct is not protected 
by the First Amendment.155  In Gooding, an anti-war demonstrator 
threatened to kill a police officer and was convicted under a state 
law that broadly prohibited “opprobrious words or abusive 
language, tending to cause a breach of the peace.”156  The Court 
did not discuss the facts and did not decide whether the 
defendant’s words were or were not constitutionally protected.  
Instead it focused on the breadth of the statute, found it faulty on 
free speech grounds, and affirmed the overruling of the 
conviction.157  In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan explained 
that, when states regulate speech, litigants may attack “overly 
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the 
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by 
a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity.”158  The 
underlying policy is that the overbroad statute will have a chilling 
effect on protected speech, so much so that even someone whose 
words are not protected should be allowed to object to it, in order 
to eliminate the chilling effect sooner rather than later.159  
Justice Breyer cites Gooding in order to stress a similarity 
between the overbreadth context and Heffernan’s mistake of fact 
                                                                                                                   
 152 Hefferman, 136 S. Ct. at 1419. 
 153 See Gooding, 405 U.S. at 530–31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that the 
overbreadth doctrine allows courts to invalidate statutes with language resulting in 
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 154 See id. (discussing the potential for overly broad statutes to deter First Amendment 
speech). 
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problem.160  In both, someone challenges official action taken 
against him, and a ruling for or against the challenge would 
enhance or diminish the protection of speech.  Because the two are 
not precisely parallel, the Court uses a “cf.” signal for the Gooding 
citation.161  According to The Bluebook, the “cf.” signal stands for 
the proposition that “[c]ited authority supports a proposition 
different from the main proposition but sufficiently analogous to 
lend support.”162  The evident point of the signal in this context is 
to indicate that the two situations—overbreadth and the Heffernan 
rule—differ in the way a chilling effect is produced.  Just as 
someone may challenge an overbroad statute in order to protect 
speech, even though his own conduct is not constitutionally 
protected, so also someone who is demoted on account of a 
supervisor’s impermissible motive should be allowed to challenge 
the demotion in order to dissuade governments from acting on 
such motives, even though he did not engage in protected speech 
at all.  The ultimate aim of both rules is to encourage the system of 
free speech. 
The overbreadth doctrine illustrates a more general theme.  
The First Amendment is more than a source of individual rights.  
Freedom of speech, of assembly, and of the press are necessary to 
proper functioning of our system of government, which is based in 
part on popular sovereignty.163  In order to participate effectively 
in public affairs, citizens need access to information.164  They also 
need to be able to discuss issues freely and share information with 
others, and to do so without fear of punishment.165  This “self-
government” rationale is among the strongest justifications for 
protecting rights of speech, press, and assembly.  It is the driving 
force behind the watershed ruling in New York Times v. 
                                                                                                                   
 160 Heffernan v. City of Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1419 (2016). 
 161 Id. 
 162 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 1.2(a) (Columbia Law Review  Ass’n 
et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015).  Law review editors typically force authors to include an explanatory 
parenthetical after a “cf.” cite.  Justice Breyer is not subject to that sort of oversight. 
 163 See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 323–25 (1816) (noting the 
Constitution of the United States was not established by the states, but by the people). 
 164 See SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 155, at 936–38 (noting the importance of free 
speech in self government). 
 165 Id. 
30 GEORGIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 51:1 
 
Sullivan166 that public officials may not recover for defamation 
unless they show that the defamatory statement was made with 
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or falsity.167  
Four years after New York Times, the Court relied on that 
theme in Pickering v. Board of Education,168 the leading public 
employee speech case.  Writing for the Court in Pickering, Justice 
Marshall cited New York Times and reiterated  “[t]he public 
interest in having free and unhindered debate on matters of public 
importance—the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First 
Amendment.”169  He then noted that “dismissal from public 
employment is . . . a potent means of inhibiting speech.”170  On this 
basis, Pickering held that “a teacher’s exercise of his right to speak 
on issues of public importance may not furnish the basis for his 
dismissal from public employment,” unless the teacher makes 
knowingly or recklessly false statements.171  The Heffernan opinion 
touches on the systemic role of freedom of speech.  Though Justice 
Breyer does not discuss First Amendment theory, he takes pains 
to point out that the phrasing of the First Amendment does not 
simply articulate individual rights against government.  Instead, 
the language targets Congress and, by extension, all of 
government, which “shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech.”172  
Federal common law always runs the risk of giving federal 
judges too much leeway to make rules on topics that are best left 
                                                                                                                   
 166 376 U.S. 254, 280–83 (1964). 
 167 See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of 
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to Congress or the states.173  The systemic value of public employee 
speech furnishes a response to that critique.  Whatever the 
appropriate scope of constitutional common law rights may be in 
other constitutional domains, the self-government rationale for 
protecting speech supports Heffernan, which reaches official acts 
that do not themselves violate constitutional rights but 
nonetheless threaten speech on matters of public concern.  Thus, 
the systemic value of the First Amendment not only helps to 
justify the recognition of a common law right in Heffernan but also 
provides a rationale for limits on the extension of substantive 
constitutional common law rights beyond the category of “speech of 
matters of public concern.”  Other constitutional doctrines may not 
warrant the creation of common law rights.  Consider, for example, 
the First Amendment protection of commercial speech, or the 
protection of sexually oriented speech that is neither obscene nor 
child pornography.  Arguably, these norms do not relate to self-
government or any other systemic value, but are strictly individual 
rights.  If that characterization is correct, it could be argued that 
the Constitution both defines those rights and sets their outer 
limits.  On that view, judicial creation of constitutional common 
law rights in those contexts would exceed the legitimate authority 
of the judiciary.174  But that objection to constitutional common 
law rights does not apply to judge-made rules that limit regulation 
of public employee speech on matters of public concern.  
2.  Constitutional Common Law and § 1983.  Heffernan sued 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.175  Both the majority and the dissent seem 
to take the position that he had to assert a violation of a 
constitutional right in order to use that statute.176  The Court 
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frames the issue in a way that suggests that Heffernan either wins 
on constitutional grounds or not at all by saying “the question is 
whether the official’s factual mistake makes a critical legal 
difference.  Even though the employee had not in fact engaged in 
protected political activity, did his demotion ‘deprive’ him of a 
‘right . . . secured by the Constitution’? 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  We hold 
that it did.”177 
This way of putting the question invites the reader to infer that 
Heffernan could win only if he proved a violation of his 
constitutional rights.  Since he did win, it seems to follow that he 
did prove a violation of his constitutional rights.  The dissent 
starts from the same premise, that “§ 1983 does not provide a 
cause of action for unauthorized government acts that do not 
infringe the constitutional rights of the § 1983 plaintiff.”178  The 
dissent finds no constitutional violation and concludes that 
Heffernan should lose.179 
Both the majority and the dissent ignore a third alternative. 
The Court’s quotation from § 1983 is incomplete and does not state 
the full scope of the statute’s reach.  After “Constitution,” it 
continues on, to include “laws.”180  That term denotes that the 
§ 1983 cause of action is not limited to litigation that alleges 
constitutional violations.  Maine v. Thiboutot held that § 1983 can 
be used to enforce federal statutes.181  The viability of a 
constitutional common law reading of Heffernan depends on 
whether the “laws” doctrine can be extended to cover a common 
law right.182  This is an open question, as the Court does not often 
engage in the kind of constitutional common law making that 
Heffernan may illustrate.  In a somewhat analogous context, 
however, the Court has accorded federal common law the same 
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status as federal statutes.  Federal statutory causes of action can 
be brought in federal court under the “federal question” 
jurisdiction of those courts, which authorizes federal district court 
jurisdiction over “all civil actions arising under the . . . laws . . . of 
the United States.”183  In Illinois v. Milwaukee the issue was 
whether federal common law causes of action  are also covered by 
the federal courts’ jurisdiction over federal questions.184  The Court 
rejected a distinction between statutory law and common law.  It 
saw “no reason not to give ‘laws’ its natural meaning, and 
therefore conclude[d] that § 1331 jurisdiction will support claims 
founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory 
origin.”185 
In light of Illinois v. Milwaukee  and the “laws” language in 
§ 1983, the Court probably would not distinguish between federal 
common law rights and federal statutory rights for the purpose of 
§ 1983 either.  But another step is required in order to justify 
access to § 1983 for constitutional common law claims.  That 
statute cannot be used to assert all federal statutory violations. 
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers 
Association ruled that two requirements must be satisfied.186  The 
§ 1983 remedy is not available if “the statute at issue [is not] the 
kind that created enforceable ‘rights’ under § 1983,” or if “Congress 
had foreclosed private enforcement” of the statute.187  No doubt 
these requirements would also apply to constitutional common 
law.  After all, the rationale for allowing access to § 1983 is that 
constitutional common law should get the same treatment as 
federal statutes. 
Both prongs favor access to § 1983 on the facts of Heffernan.  In 
order to show why, a bit of background information is needed.  The 
“enforceable right” prong typically trips up plaintiffs who try to 
rely on federal programs that grant money to state governments 
and impose restrictions on how it is used.  For example, the 
Family Educational and Privacy Rights Act of 1974 (FERPA) 
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requires schools that receive federal funding to keep student 
records confidential.188  In Gonzaga University v. Doe, a student 
charged that the university violated FERPA by disclosing charges 
that he had sexually assaulted another student.189  FERPA 
contains no authorization of private enforcement.190  The student 
brought a § 1983 “laws” suit, seeking damages under a provision of 
the statute that provided “[n]o funds shall be made available 
under any applicable program to any educational agency or 
institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the release 
of education records . . . of students without the written consent of 
their parents to any individual, agency, or organization . . . .”191 
The Court held that this language did not create enforceable 
rights.  It noted, among other things, that the provision was 
directed at the Secretary of Education, so that the focus was “two 
steps removed from the interests of individual students . . . and 
clearly does not confer the sort of individual entitlement that is 
actionable under § 1983.”192  By contrast, a provision in the 
Medicaid Act, which provided that “[a] State Plan for medical 
assistance must provide for making medical assistance 
available”193 to certain persons, was “precisely the sort of ‘rights-
creating’ language identified in Gonzaga as critical to 
demonstrating a congressional intent to establish a new right.”194 
On its face, Heffernan’s recognition of a constitutional common law 
right to recover damages for a demotion would satisfy this 
“enforceable right” requirement. 
The second prong is generally treated as a default rule in favor 
of access to § 1983 unless a given statute provides a remedy that is 
meant to be exclusive.  For example, the plaintiff in City of Rancho 
Palos Verdes v. Abrams sought to sue under § 1983 for a violation 
of the Telecommunications Act, which limits local zoning authority 
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 192 Id. at 274–75. 
 193 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (2016). 
 194 S.D. v. Hood, 391 F.3d 581, 603 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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over cellphone towers.195  Since the Telecommunications Act itself 
provided a remedy, albeit a more restrictive one than § 1983, the 
Court confined him to that remedy.196  The constitutional common 
law reading of Heffernan does not raise this issue, simply because 
the plaintiff seeks to enforce  a judge-made right rather than a 
statute.197  Therefore, Heffernan does not encounter any statutory 
remedial scheme that might displace § 1983.  In short, a 
conception of Heffernan liability as a constitutional common law 
right would require a novel holding that § 1983 authorizes 
litigation to enforce such rights, but there is ample authority to 
support such a holding. 
B.  EQUAL PROTECTION  
The intuition that Jeffrey Heffernan ought to have a remedy 
has two sources—not only free speech values but also arbitrary 
treatment by supervisors.  Throughout the Heffernan litigation, 
the parties and the courts centered their attention on the First 
Amendment.198  But the injustice of the demotion results at least 
as much from the lack of any good reason for it, especially after 
Heffernan told his supervisors that they were mistaken, as he 
claimed to have done in his testimony at trial.199  Putting the 
public employee speech issue aside, the case suggests that Chief 
Wittig acted arbitrarily and capriciously toward Heffernan.  In 
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech the Court said that its doctrine on 
Equal Protection includes a “class of one” theory, which applies to 
situations “where the plaintiff alleges that she has been 
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and 
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that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.”200  
In Willowbrook the plaintiffs claimed that the village had 
demanded a 33-foot easement to connect their property to the 
municipal water supply, though it had sought only an 18-foot 
easement from other property owners.201  The Court ruled that an 
Equal Protection violation could be established by proof that there 
was no good reason for the difference.202  The underlying principle 
is that “ ‘the purpose of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person within the 
State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary 
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute 
or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.’ ”203 
If Heffernan could show that Chief Wittig had no other reason 
for the demotion other than the Chief’s own mistaken impression, 
he might well be able to prove that he had been treated differently 
from others without a rational basis.  The theory is plausible 
because it seems unlikely that Wittig could have become chief of 
police or remained in that position if he routinely engaged in this 
approach to personnel management.  The circumstances of the 
case reinforce the argument.  Chief Wittig had been appointed by 
the current mayor.204  Spagnola was the current mayor’s opponent 
in the upcoming election.205  Heffernan’s mother asked for a 
Spagnola yard sign. Heffernan acknowledged his own friendly 
relations with Spagnola.206  These facts support Heffernan’s “no 
rational basis” charge, for a jury may well be persuaded that 
Wittig acted out of animus toward him, not because of speech but 
merely because Heffernan was a friend of Wittig’s political 
enemy.207 
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Despite the attractions of the “class of one” approach, 
Heffernan’s lawyer did not pursue it.  The problem is the holding 
in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture.208  In Engquist a 
supervisor eliminated the plaintiff’s position in the Department of 
Agriculture and promoted her rival.209  The plaintiff sued on a 
“class of one” theory, on the ground that she was fired for 
“arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons.”210  The Court did 
not reject her claim on its facts.  It issued a sweeping rule that the 
“class of one” theory “has no place in the public employment 
context.”211  Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts explained 
that some areas of state action, including public employment, 
“involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of 
subjective, individualized assessments.”212  Since “employment 
decisions are quite often subjective and individualized, resting on 
a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and 
quantify,”  the “class of one” theory “is simply a poor fit in the 
public employment context.”213  
This language raises a big hurdle to the Equal Protection cause 
of action in a case like Heffernan.  But the language is more 
general than it needed to be to resolve cases like Engquist.  The 
problem in Engquist was that “class of one” suits interfere with 
government supervisors’ need for discretion in choosing among 
employees for promotion or dismissal.214  That is a recurring 
situation in every government office.  It is one that is guaranteed 
to produce friction and hurt feelings.  A rule that allows a 
disgruntled employee or former employee to sue would 
significantly hinder the efficient operation of government offices 
because employees who are passed over will often feel that 
supervisors have treated them unfairly.  Constitutional litigation 
in the federal courts may not be the optimal way of resolving such 
disputes.   
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By contrast, the “mistake of fact” issue in Heffernan does not 
involve the exercise of discretion when choosing among employees.  
It will probably arise much less often.  In particular, it seems 
unlikely that many supervisors would decline to reverse a 
demotion upon learning of their mistaken premise. Jeffrey 
Heffernan may have been able to show that he was targeted for 
unfair treatment, not because he expressed his political beliefs, 
but because he was a friend of Wittig’s political adversary, or 
merely because his mother supported that adversary.  Heffernan’s 
case might be distinguished from Engqusit on this ground, though 
doing so would require the Court to walk back the broad language 
of the Engquist opinion. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Some legal scholarship criticizes judicial reasoning in order to 
undermine the rule a court has imposed or the result a court has 
reached.  This Article takes a different approach.  It finds fault 
with the reasons offered by the Court in Heffernan, but does not 
take issue with Jeffrey Heffernan’s victory.  For the sake of the 
development of doctrine over time, it is essential to raise questions 
about the Court’s reasoning, and all the more so when the result is 
warranted.  Our collective ambition should be to come up with 
“[i]deas which will stand the test of time as instruments for the 
solution of hard problems . . . .”215  If the rationale for the 
Heffernan holding is weak, the case may have little impact outside 
of its narrow facts.  Yet the rule announced in Heffernan seems 
worthy of extension to similar fact patterns.  The task is to build a 
more solid foundation for it than is provided by the Court’s 
makeshift opinion.  For this reason, it seems worthwhile to 
attempt to justify the outcome by looking outside the opinion for 
more persuasive alternatives. 
In my view, the holding might be extended in either of two 
directions, depending on which of two alternate rationales is 
adopted.  I have suggested that the difficulties with the 
“constitutional right” and “local government liability” theories 
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could be overcome by locating the right in federal common law 
instead of either the First Amendment or § 1983. Another 
approach is to de-emphasize the free speech dimension of the case 
and come to the problem from a different angle.  Thus, Jeffrey 
Heffernan might have won under the “class of one” theory of 
recovery under the Equal Protection clause, had he persuaded the 
Court to limit the unduly broad language of Engquist. 
